Whoever Bohadan Pilicinski is, he seems to have some familiarity with how covert ops work. That said, it is surprising that he didn’t turn his highly critical viewpoint on the official explanations of the event; he notes that two of the hijackers rented a room from an FBI agent without either, apparently, spotting the other, and he seems to accept the idea that jet fuel (kerosene) could create a fire hot enough to melt steel, etc….hey, this is just one piece of the puzzle…
September 11 was a third-rate operation
By Bohdan Pilacinski
In late April of 2001, just five months before the September 11 attack date, Mohamed Atta was stopped for driving erratically late at night near Ft Lauderdale, Florida. By then, the pilots all had their licenses, final-phase planning must have been under way. Yet, here was Osama bin Laden’s field commander for the entire operation, driving a red Pontiac (though 15 years old), with Arabic stickers, and no driver’s license, or at least none he would show.
Warned and lucky, Atta was told to show up for a court date, with a license, or a warrant would go out for his arrest. He got the license but failed to show. Ten weeks later, he was stopped for speeding, but unaccountably no computer coughed up a warrant. Now Florida has reciprocity; so at least in theory and for no good reason, the September 11 attack team functioned its last four months with an arrest warrant out for their leader in 50 states.
Having sorted out the contestants in their publicly touted “mastermind” of the month contest, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released this disclosure of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, (so successfully water-boarded in Pakistan). Zacarias Moussaoui, who’d presumably attracted Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attention by advising his flight instructor that he wasn’t much interested in take-offs and landings , hadn’t been a member of the 9/11 teams at all; he was being held in reserve. Why? Because he was a belligerent loud-mouth and hence a security risk. As he so proved.
Point is, any decent handler with minimal judgment and authority would have yanked Moussaoui out of the country within days of this assessment. But no, he was left scheming on his own, possibly with consequences for al-Qaeda more severe than we know … such as forcing the attack date.
No license, sloppy driving, even Arabic stickers; worse, an unbalanced agent working solo. These aren’t just lapses in the learning curve of an amateur operation; these are ludicrous standards for operational security in any clandestine organization.
In the orchestrated fear campaign pursuant to the attack, we were systematically inundated with extravagant claims for al-Qaeda’s potency, reach, cohesion, dedication, vision and Satanic focus. Dr No on petrodollars! Everything Vladimir Lenin could wish he’d had or been! Of course much of this has since – in the jargon of the financial press – been “subject to downward revision”; yet, to this day, insistence on al-Qaeda as a formerly monolithic, then metastasized, demon pathology of epic capacity for terror and evil, has been virtually obligatory throughout the US media: left, right and center.